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Abstract
The belief that one is in a worse situation than similar others (Relative Deprivation) has 
been associated with involvement in a range of maladaptive escape behaviors, including 
excessive risk taking. Yet not everyone scoring high on measures of relative deprivation 
makes maladaptive choices. We hypothesized that hope may ameliorate the negative effects 
of relative deprivation. In two laboratory-based experiments using a novel risk-taking task 
(N = 101) we show that hope reduces risk-taking behavior in relatively deprived partici-
pants. A third study (N = 122) extended the moderating effect of hope on relative depriva-
tion to real-world risk behavior; increased hope was associated with decreased likelihood 
of loss of control of one’s gambling behavior in relatively deprived individuals. Nurturing 
hope in relatively deprived populations may protect them against maladaptive behaviors 
with potential applications for harm reduction.
Keywords Relative deprivation · Hope · Gambling · Risk · Intervention
Introduction
“Comparison is the thief of joy.”
Theodore Roosevelt
 The concept of Relative Deprivation (RD) has been widely adopted throughout the 
social sciences - from criminology (e.g., Lea and Young 1993) and economics (e.g., 
Yitzhaki 1979) to political science (Lichbach 1990) and history (Snyder and Tilly 1972) 
- to characterize the comparison between an individual and others. Operationally, Rela-
tive Deprivation (RD) is the belief that one is in a worse situation than similar oth-
ers (e.g., neighbours), an observation that triggers negative emotions such as anger and 
resentment (see Crosby 1976; Folger 1987; Stiles et  al. 2000), which in turn triggers 
achievement, escape and/or deviant behaviors (see Smith et al. 2012 for a review). Thus, 
RD is a social psychological construct; “it postulates a subjective state that shapes emo-
tions, cognitions and behavior” (Pettigrew 2016, p. 9), and is a key concept invoked to 
explain a range of behaviors across the social sciences (Walker and Smith 2002).
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The feelings of anger and resentment stemming from RD encourage the relatively 
deprived to engage in behaviors that allay or overcome negative emotions (Smith et  al. 
2012). RD has been directly associated with a range of addictive behaviors, including alco-
hol consumption and excessive gambling (see Table 1). For instance, Callan et al. (2011) 
reported that “because personal relative deprivation is an aversive state, people are often 
motivated to reduce it by engaging in various [risky] behaviors” (p. 956). Yet it is also 
the case that not all relatively deprived individuals engage in maladaptive behaviors. One 
promising construct that we hypothesise may moderate the relationship between RD and 
maladaptive behavior is the psychological construct of hope. Hope is “a positive motiva-
tional state that is based on an interactively derived sense of successful (a) agency (goal-
directed energy), and (b) pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Snyder et al. 1991, p. 287). 
The pathway component of hope reflects the ability to produce plausible alternate routes 
when pursuing desired goals (Snyder 2002). Agency-thinking represents the motivational 
component of hope theory, that is, the mental energy that is required to pursue goals (Sny-
der 2002). Although agency-thinking is important in all aspects of goal pursuit, it is espe-
cially vital when encountering obstacles (Snyder 1994, 2002).
Therefore, in the face of RD, we predict that high-hopers are likely to possess the moti-
vational energy (agency-thinking) required to overcome RD. However, low-hopers’ lack of 
agency-thinking to overcome RD is likely to encourage the use of avoidant-coping strat-
egies (i.e., gambling) that temporarily allay negative feelings that they continue to face. 
There is much evidence that remaining hopeful in the face of adversity can be advanta-
geous (see Snyder 2002; Valle et  al. 2006). For instance, when hopeful individuals face 
obstacles during goal pursuit, they show flexibility in their approach and find alternative 
pathways that they persist with (Snyder 2002). In contrast, individuals low in hope rumi-
nate about the hurdle (Michael 2000) and “engage in almost magical escape fantasies” 
(Snyder 2002, p. 261). This also showcases the overlap between hope and executive func-
tion abilities such as flexibility, planning and self-control, all of which are vital in dealing 
with adversities; research has found greater executive function is associated with greater 
pathways and agency components of hope (see Fallucca 2018; Kruger 2011; Sears 2007). 
Indeed, the overlap between hope and executive functions further suggests that higher lev-
els of hope can protect the vulnerable against maladaptive behaviors, especially as studies 
have found a relationship between poor executive functions (i.e., planning) and engage-
ment in problem behaviors (e.g., problem gambling) (von Hippel et al. 2009; Ledgerwood 
et al. 2012).
To put the above into context, imagine two relatively deprived individuals, Harry and 
Clive. Harry (a high-hope individual) and Clive (a low-hoper) both believe that participa-
tion in career development activities can lead to a better-paid job, which can help overcome 
RD and the accompanying negative emotions. Both Harry and Clive also know that gam-
bling can temporarily alleviate the negative emotions stemming from RD but is unlikely to 
help in overcoming RD altogether; instead, losing money is likely to magnify the problem. 
Nonetheless, Clive is unable to stay motivated in the face of obstacles, instead, Clive rumi-
nates over obstacles and uses gambling to forget about his problems. Harry, not fazed by 
obstacles, decides to think of several methods in which he can achieve the same outcome, 
overcoming RD. Even during moments of desperation, Harry remains hopeful and moti-
vated to continue along the path he knows is best. It is this difference in hope that indi-
cates whether an individual is likely to succeed in overcoming adversities (i.e., RD and the 
accompanying negative emotions) or instead relies on escape behaviors to cope with the 
negative emotions that they continue to face.
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In summary, it is evident that the constructs of RD and hope are individually predictive 
of a range of activities, but they have not previously been considered together. Below we 
explore for the first time whether hope moderates participation in a risk-taking context both 
in the laboratory (Experiments 1 and 2) and in the field (as measured by participation in 
gambling, Experiment 3).
Experiment 1
We hypothesized that increases in hope would reduce risk-taking among relatively deprived 
individuals. To put our hypotheses to the test, Experiment 1 examined whether self-report 
measures of hope and RD predict risk-taking in a novel gambling-like risk game in the 
laboratory.
Methods
Participants
Fifty-five participants (45 females and 10 males; age range 18–22  years, M = 19.58, 
SD = 1.07) were recruited from the student population on a university campus via a vol-
unteer participant credit system. The sample consists of 82% female and 18% male partici-
pants, which is representative of the undergraduate Psychology student population at the 
university campus where data were collected. A priori power analysis (using the G*Power 
3.1 tool: Faul et al. 2009) indicated that for a regression model consisting of 7 predictor 
variables, 51 participants would be required to detect a large effect (R2 = 0.25) with 80% 
power (1-β err prob = 0.8).
Materials
The Adult Hope Scale Snyder et al.’s (1991) Adult Hope Scale was used to measure par-
ticipants’ level of hope; the scale has been shown to load reliably on two-factors across 
languages (e.g., English, French, Japanese and Portuguese)  and diverse populations (see 
Gana et  al. 2013; Kato and Snyder 2005; Marques et  al. 2014; Snyder et  al. 1991). The 
12-item scale is divided into two subscales based on Snyder’s cognitive model of hope: 
(1) Agency (i.e., goal-directed energy) and (2) Pathways (i.e., number of alternate routes 
to desired goals). Four of the 12 items make up the agency subscale (e.g., I energetically 
pursue my goals), four make up the pathway subscale (e.g., I can think of many ways to get 
out of a jam), while the remaining four were filler items (e.g., I feel tired most of the time). 
Participants were asked to rate each item on an 8-point scale (1 = definitely false—8 = defi-
nitely true).
Personal Relative Deprivation Scale (PRDS) Callan et al.’s (2011) 5-item PRDS (α = 0.78) 
was designed to measure participants’ general beliefs and feelings of their outcomes rela-
tive to similar others. Example items include: I feel deprived when I think about what I 
have compared to what other people like me have and I feel privileged compared to other 
people like me. Each item is rated on a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree—6 = strongly 
agree).
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Risk Game The task used to measure participants’ risk-taking is a novel game that was 
created on UNITY software. In the game, a cannon fires a ball that could land anywhere 
between 0 and 100 m from the cannon (see Fig. 1); participants are asked to bet on where 
they think the ball will land (see Fig. 2). For instance, a participant may feel that the ball 
will land between 20 and 30 m, thus covering this ground in their bet. When choosing a 
distance to cover, participants are given a choice of three range groups to choose from (as 
shown in Fig. 2): the high-risk option allows participants to cover less ground (5-m range) 
than both the moderate (10-m range) and low-risk (20-m range) alternatives. However, 
greater potential returns (larger incentives for winning) may make the high-risk option 
more appealing than the moderate and low-risk alternatives. That is, although the low-risk 
option covers more distance and thus increases one’s chance of winning, the larger incen-
tives (potential returns) accompanying the moderate and high-risk options may be more 
attractive to participants.
The risk game consisted of ten experimental rounds which comprised five loss rounds 
(rounds 1, 2, 6, 8 and 9); and five win rounds (rounds 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10). Unaware that 
the game is rigged (until debrief, participants were told that this is a game of chance), 
in each round, participants were asked to choose a distance range to cover from one of 
the three risk options. Each bet deducted 10 points from participants’ credit (partici-
pants started the game with 100 points in credit—no real money was being bet); par-
ticipants selected their range from the dropdown menu which also indicated potential 
returns (i.e., points credited for winning). 210 points were credited for winning on the 
Fig. 1  A cannon (left image) fires a ball that could land anywhere between 0 and 100 m from the cannon 
(11.25 m in this example)
Fig. 2  Place your bet page (risk 
decreasing from left to right)
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high-risk option, 110 points for winning on the moderate-risk option, and 60 points for 
winning on the low-risk option, thus higher potential returns indicate greater risk-tak-
ing. Consequently, the sum of participants’ potential returns throughout the ten experi-
mental rounds were used as a measure of risk-taking (higher figures indicate greater 
risk-taking).
Task‑Comprehension Questionnaire A four-item task-comprehension questionnaire 
was produced to test participants’ understanding of the risk game. Once participants had 
received a detailed explanation of the risk game and played one trial round, they were 
asked to complete the first two questions of the task-comprehension questionnaire: (1) how 
many points could you potentially win by choosing the low-risk option?; and (2) when 
placing a bet, selecting which of the following odds will lead to a better chance of win-
ning? Participants were able to choose one of the three options given in the risk game 
(see Fig. 2). After completing questions one and two, feedback was given to participants to 
ensure that they understood the game. Participants were then asked to complete questions 
three and four, which were similar to questions one and two; participants were excluded if 
they failed to answer questions three and four correctly.
Procedure
Participants first completed an online questionnaire, prior to attending a laboratory-
based session one week later. The online questionnaire comprised demographic ques-
tions (age and gender), the Adult Hope scale and the PRDS. During the laboratory-
based session, participants initially received a detailed explanation of the risk game 
and were given one trial round to play, after which, they were asked to complete the 
task-comprehension questionnaire. Upon completion of the task-comprehension ques-
tionnaire, participants were asked to play the risk game for real monetary incentives cal-
culated as £1 for every 200 points gained, though payment was dependent on the rolling 
of a die. That is, once participants were informed of their score on the risk game, they 
were asked to choose a number between one to six and to roll a die; payment was made 
only if the die landed on the participant’s chosen number. The payment structure in this 
study was due to budgetary/financial constraints. However, research findings indicate 
that the approach to paying only some participants for their choices does not influence 
behavior (see Bolle 1990; Charness et al. 2016). Finally, participants were debriefed and 
thanked for their contribution.
Data Analyses
The outcome variable was calculated as the sum of potential returns across the ten 
experimental rounds (greater figures indicate greater risk-taking). A three-stage hier-
archical regression model was used to examine whether the relation between RD and 
risk-taking was moderated by either the agency or pathway components of hope, when 
controlling for age and gender. The rejection level for all analyses was set at p = 0.05.
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Results
Four participants failed the task-comprehension questionnaire and were thus excluded from 
analyses. The remaining fifty-one (43 females and 8 males) participants’ data were used 
for analyses; participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 22 years old (M = 19.45, SD = 0.97). A 
three-stage hierarchical regression was conducted with the sum of potential returns as the 
outcome variable (labelled risk-taking from this point on). The covariate variables age and 
gender were entered at stage one of the regression model as research has shown these to 
influence gambling behavior (see Johansson et al. 2009). The predictor variables agency, 
pathway and RD were entered at stage two of the regression and two interaction variables 
(Agency x RD and Pathway x RD) were computed and entered at stage three. Significant 
results indicate that the agency component of hope played a moderating role in the relation 
between RD and risk-taking (see Table 2 and Fig. 3).
Discussion
Our results indicate that agency-thinking (i.e., goal-directed energy) is positively correlated 
with risk-taking when RD scores are low (i.e., when feeling relatively privileged) and neg-
atively correlated with risk-taking when RD scores are high (i.e., when feeling relatively 
deprived). However, our results show that pathway-thinking (i.e., number of plausible 
alternate routes to desired goals) and RD, in interaction, do not predict changes in risk-tak-
ing. Therefore Experiment 1 provides correlational evidence in support of our hypotheses, 
Table 2  Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting risk-taking
Note. N = 51; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limit of a Confi-
dence Interval (for B); A post hoc power analysis indicated that our results produced a power of 97.7%, (1-β 
err prob = 0.977) indicating that this study had an adequate sample size
Variable β 95% CI (LL, UL) t SE R R2 ΔR2 F ΔF ΔF p p
Model 1 0.34 0.12 0.12 3.15 3.15 0.052 0.052
Age 0.30 (5.64, 169.78) 2.15 40.82 0.037*
Gender 0.12 (−123.40, 308.15) 0.86 107.32 0.394
Model 2 0.37 0.14 0.02 1.40 0.33 0.804 0.241
Age 0.32 (7.97, 178.59) 2.20 42.35 0.033*
Gender 0.14 (−113.59, 335.06) 0.99 111.38 0.325
Agency − 0.01 (−23.92, 23.23) − 0.03 11.71 0.977
Pathway − 0.15 (−30.44, 11.58) − 0.90 10.43 0.371
RD − 0.04 (−26.59, 20.29) − 0.27 11.64 0.788
Model 3 0.61 0.37 0.24 3.60 8.00 0.001*** 0.004**
Age 0.39 (38.09, 189.33) 3.03 37.50 0.004**
Gender 0.11 (−111.81, 285.82) 0.88 98.59 0.382
Agency 0.07 (−16.71, 26.38) 0.45 10.68 0.653
Pathway − 0.27 (−37.08, 1.80) − 1.83 9.64 0.074
RD − 0.22 (−37.97, 5.71) − 1.49 10.83 0.144
Agency X RD − 0.51 (−14.26, − 3.28) − 3.22 2.72 0.002**
Pathway X RD − 0.04 (−6.30, 4.76) − 0.28 2.74 0.780
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but it does not determine whether feelings of relative deprivation cause changes in risk-
taking among low and high-hope individuals.
Experiment 2
To test the causal effect of relative deprivation on risk-taking moderated by hope this 
study employed an experimental manipulation to induce feelings of relative deprivation 
and privilege. This experimental manipulation was a modified version of that validated by 
Callan et al. (2008). In short, the aim of this study was to test whether feeling relatively 
deprived—elicited by the knowledge that one has less discretionary income than similar 
others—causes greater risk-taking among low-hope persons and decreased risk-taking 
among high-hope persons. As in Experiment 1, age and gender were added as covariates. 
Moreover, family income was also added as a covariate as participants’ Socioeconomic 
Status (SES) (family income is one measure of SES) may impact whether the experimental 
manipulations had the desired effect or not (i.e., individuals with high family income may 
not believe the cover story used to induce feelings of relative deprivation).
Methods
Participants
Fifty-one participants (41 females and 10 males) were initially recruited from the student 
population on a university campus. The sample, which consists of a  majority of  female 
participants, is representative of the undergraduate Psychology student population at the 
university campus where data were collected. All 51 students were Psychology students 
recruited via a volunteer participant credit system; participants’ age ranged from 18 to 
39 years old (M = 20.31, SD = 3.28). While a priori power analysis using the G*Power 3.1 
tool (Faul et al. 2009) indicated that a regression model consisting of 8 predictor variables 
Fig. 3  The effect of agency-thinking and RD (in interaction) on risk-taking in Experiment 1. Note. Points 
are plotted at ± 1 SD of the mean
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would require 54 participants to detect a large effect (R2 = 0.25) with 80% power (1-β err 
prob = 0.8), post hoc power analysis from Experiment 1 indicated that a sample size of 51 
will produce a high statistical power.
Materials and Procedure
Participants first completed an online questionnaire before attending a laboratory-based 
session a week later. The online questionnaire comprised the Adult Hope scale (as in 
Experiment 1), as well as demographic and personal information questions (i.e., age, gen-
der, home postcode and family income). During the laboratory session, to deceive partici-
pants into believing that they are relatively deprived/privileged in comparison to similar 
others, and thus induce feelings of relative deprivation/privilege, we formulated the cover 
story that answers provided in the online questionnaire were used to calculate Comparative 
Discretionary Income (CDI) index scores. We used the following text to induce feelings of 
relative deprivation/privilege:
Your Comparative Discretionary Income (CDI) index score was derived from sta-
tistical analyses using both the information from the online questionnaire you com-
pleted and the information in our database from people who matched your profile. 
From your CDI index score, we were able to figure out how deprived/privileged you 
are in comparison to similar others (i.e., similar age, gender, etc.). The scale below 
points to the range your CDI index score falls within.
Once the text was read out to the participant, they were informed of their CDI Index Score 
and where on a scale of extremely deprived to extremely privileged, their score was located 
(participants were unaware that this scale was invented for this experiment and thus not a 
true scale); the page containing this information was then handed to the participants for 
review (see Fig. 4).
Fig. 4  Experimental manipulations: inducing feelings of relative deprivation/privilege
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Once participants had reviewed the above page (Fig. 4), the procedure was the same as 
in Experiment 1.
Data Analyses
As in Experiment 1, a three-stage hierarchical regression model was used to analyze 
results; the outcome variable remained the same (potential returns across ten experimen-
tal rounds, labelled as risk-taking). In addition to age and gender, family income was also 
entered at stage one of the regression model. Agency-thinking, pathway-thinking and con-
dition (categorical variable: relatively deprived vs. relatively privileged) were entered at 
stage two of the model. Finally, two interaction variables (Agency X Condition and Path-
way X Condition) were computed and entered at stage three of the regression model. The 
rejection level for all analyses was set at p = 0.05.
Results
One participant failed the task-comprehension questionnaire and was excluded from analy-
ses. The remaining 50 (40 females and 10 males) participants’ data were used for anal-
yses; participants’ age ranged from 18 to 39  years old (M = 20.34, SD = 3.31). A three-
stage hierarchical regression was conducted to test whether feelings of relative deprivation/
privilege caused changes in risk-taking among low and high-hope individuals (see Table 3 
for regression statistics). The results indicated that among relatively privileged persons, as 
agency-thinking increases, so does risk-taking, whereas, among the relatively deprived, as 
agency-thinking increases, risk-taking reduces (see Fig. 5).
Discussion
In Experiment 2, we found the same pattern of results as in Experiment 1, though by exper-
imentally inducing feelings of relative deprivation/privilege, our results confirm that feel-
ings of relative deprivation cause greater risk-taking among individuals with low agency, 
while higher agency ameliorates the damaging effect of RD. Therefore, across Experiments 
1 and 2, we have shown that an interplay between hope and RD predict changes in risk-tak-
ing. More specifically, our findings indicate that hope (specifically, the agency component 
of hope) can buffer against risk-taking among the relatively deprived. Next, we wanted to 
examine whether a similar effect was found in a gambling population, thus testing whether 
these two constructs together have the predicted effect on a real-world risk behavior, prob-
lem gambling severity.
Experiment 3
There is some evidence that people rely on excessive gambling to compensate for feelings 
of resentment stemming from RD (e.g., Callan et al. 2008, 2011). Studies have also shown 
that Problem Gambling often appears when individuals use gambling as a means of avoid-
ing, coping with and/or escaping negative emotions (see Blaszczynski and Nower 2002). 
However, our findings from Experiments 1 and 2 provide some indication that hope can 
buffer against excessive gambling among individuals who view risk-taking (e.g., gambling) 
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as a means of allaying negative feelings. Accordingly, we predict that among relatively 
deprived individuals, increases in hope will decrease gambling severity, as measured by 
the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI: Ferris and Wynne 2001). Therefore, while 
Experiments 1 and 2 examined risk-taking in the laboratory, Experiment 3 aims to examine 
real-world risk behavior (gambling severity among gamblers).
Methods
Participants
We were targeting a sample of at least 51 participants necessary to uncover a large effect size 
(R2 = 0.25) in a regression model which includes seven predictor variables, on the basis of 
an alpha of 0.05% and 80% power (1-β err prob = 0.8). However, to overcome low response 
rates common with Web surveys (see Couper 2000), we used snowball sampling to recruit 
participants over 20 days, which led to 236 participants starting the survey (advertised on 
Twitter), of which a total of 122 participants (52%) completed the survey and were included 
in analyses. While snowball sampling has some drawbacks (e.g., little control over the 
demographic/number of participants recruited), it is a useful approach for overcoming low 
response rates common with Web surveys and recruiting from hard-to-recruit populations 
(Berndt 2020; Sharma 2017). Indeed, the drawbacks of the employed snowball sampling 
method may be one key reason why the majority of the participants recruited were male 
(i.e., male participants may have engaged more with the study and in turn recruited more 
male friends to complete the study). Participants consisted of 17 females and 105 males, 
whose age ranged from 18 to 60 years old (M = 28.80, SD = 9.25). All 122 participants who 
completed the online questionnaire had gambled at least once in the past 12 months.
Materials and Procedure
A survey created on Qualtrics was advertised online (Twitter). The post included a link to 
the survey and an invitation letter that highlighted, to complete the questionnaire study, 
one must be 18 years of age or over and have gambled at least once in the past 12 months; 
these two conditions were again specified on the consent form. Moreover, a clear statement 
on the consent form emphasised that responses to this survey will be kept confidential and 
Fig. 5  The effect of relative deprivation/privilege (experimentally induced) and agency-thinking (in interac-
tion) on risk-taking in Experiment 2. Note. Points are plotted at ±1 SD of the mean
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anonymous; empirical evidence indicates that individuals disclose sensitive information 
more accurately under anonymous conditions (see Ong and Weiss 2000; Werch 1990).
On the online survey, participants were asked to provide demographic information (age 
and gender) and whether they had gambled at least once in the past 12 months. Participants 
were then asked to complete The Adult Hope scale, the PRDS (both identical to Experi-
ments 1) and the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI).
Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) Ferris and Wynne’s (2001) 9-item PGSI 
(α = 0.94) is an assessment tool that was constructed to measure problem gambling severity 
in the general population. Each of the nine items (e.g., when you gambled, did you go back 
another day to win back the money you lost?) require respondents to answer on a four-point 
likert scale (0 = never, 1 = sometimes, 2 = most of the time, 3 = almost always). The total 
score is interpreted as: no gambling problem (score of 0); low level of problems with few 
or no identified negative consequences (score of 1 or 2); moderate level of problems lead-
ing to some negative consequences (scores between 3 and 7); or problem gambling with 
negative consequences and a possible loss of control (scores of 8 or more).
Typically, absolute PGSI scores are converted into four categories (no-problem, low-
risk, moderate-risk and problem gambling) and are treated as a continuous measure of 
problem gambling severity (see Currie et al. 2013). However, the numerical scoring sys-
tem of the PGSI is more consistent with the characteristics of an ordinal scale than a ratio 
scale (i.e., the equivalency between scale points is not assumed). Therefore, the range of 
scores for each category varies considerably; a 1-point range is used for the non-problem 
gambling category, a 2-point range for the low-risk, a 5-point range for the moderate-risk 
and a 19-point range for the problem gambling category, which could impact the temporal 
stability of the PGSI classifications (Currie et al. 2013). Nevertheless, evidence suggests 
that the PGSI is psychometrically stronger than similar screening tools including the South 
Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS), the Victorian Gambling Screen and DSM-IV based scales 
(McMillen and Wenzel 2006; Orford et al. 2010).
Data Analyses
As recommended, the outcome variable (PGSI) was converted to a categorical variable. 
The four categories included: non-problem (score of 0), low-level (scores of 1 or 2), mod-
erate-level (scores between 3 and 7), or problem (scores of 8 or more) gambling (Ferris and 
Wynne 2001). A three-stage hierarchical regression model was used to examine whether 
the relation between RD and gambling severity was moderated by either the agency-think-
ing or pathway-thinking components of hope, when controlling for age and gender.1 The 
rejection level for all analyses was set at p = 0.05.
1 Although it is suggested that the PGSI scale—once converted into categories of non-problem, low-risk, 
moderate-risk, and problem gambling—should be treated as a continuous scale, it remains a concern that 
the scale shares more characteristics with an ordinal scale than a ratio scale. As such, we conducted an 
ordinal regression (all variables remained the same) and a multiple linear regression that included all the 
same predictor variables but substituted the outcome variable (from the typical categorical processing of 
the PGSI) to absolute PGSI scores. Results from both the ordinal regression [X2 (7, N  =  122)  =  33.41, 
p < 0.001, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.26] and the multiple linear regression with absolute PGSI entered as the out-
come variable [F(7, 114) = 5.92, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.27] reveal the same pattern of significant results (i.e., 
model and Agency X RD interaction term are significant).
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Results
A total of 122 participants’ data were used for analyses: as identified by PGSI scores, 33 
participants had no gambling problems (27%), 32 had low level of problems with few or 
no identified negative consequences (26%), 46 had moderate level of problems leading to 
some negative consequences (38%) while 11 participants were problem gamblers with neg-
ative consequences and a possible loss of control (9%). A three-stage hierarchical regres-
sion was conducted with categorized PGSI scores as the outcome variable (see footnote 1). 
The covariate variables age and gender were entered at stage one of the regression model. 
The predictor variables agency, pathways and RD were entered at stage two of the regres-
sion and two interaction variables (agency X RD and pathways X RD) were computed and 
entered at stage three. Significant results indicate that hope (agency component) plays a 
moderating role in the relation between RD and gambling severity (see Table 4 for regres-
sion statistics). Although categorized PGSI scores were used to run the regression analysis, 
absolute PGSI scores were used to visually demonstrate the relation between RD and gam-
bling severity among low and high agency-thinking persons (see Fig. 6).
Discussion
Consistent with our predictions, an inverse correlation between hope (agency compo-
nent) and problem gambling severity existed among relatively deprived individuals, indi-
cating that high agency-thinking individuals are less likely to gamble problematically in 
Table 4  Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting gambling severity
Note. N = 122; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limit of a Con-
fidence Interval (for B); A post hoc power analysis indicated that our results produced a power of 99.8%, 
(1-β err prob = 0.998) indicating that this study had an adequate sample size
Variable β 95% CI (LL, UL) t SE R R2 ΔR2 F ΔF ΔF p p
Model 1 0.20 0.04 0.04 2.46 2.46 0.090 0.090
Age − 0.11 (− 0.03, 0.01) − 1.17 0.01 0.245
Gender − 0.17 (− 0.95, 0.04) − 1.83 0.25 0.069
Model 2 0.46 0.21 0.17 6.13 8.27 0.001*** 0.001***
Age − 0.06 (− 0.02, 0.01) − 0.77 0.01 0.445
Gender − 0.13 (− 0.83, 0.11) − 1.51 0.24 0.134
Agency − 0.28 (− 0.10, − 0.02) − 2.69 0.02 0.008**
Pathways − 0.07 (− 0.07, 0.03) − 0.63 0.03 0.528
RD 0.17 (− 0.01, 0.08) 1.86 0.02 0.065
Model 3 0.49 0.24 0.04 5.27 2.68 0.073 0.001***
Age − 0.07 (− 0.02, 0.01) − 0.82 0.01 0.412
Gender − 0.12 (− 0.79, 0.14) − 1.37 0.24 0.173
Agency − 0.30 (− 0.11, − 0.02) − 2.92 0.02 0.004**
Pathways − 0.05 (− 0.06, 0.04) − 0.47 0.03 0.643
RD 0.15 (− 0.01, 0.07) 1.70 0.02 0.091
Agency X RD − 0.24 (− 0.02, − 0.01) − 2.32 0.01 0.022*
Pathways X RD 0.14 (− 0.01, 0.02) 1.35 0.01 0.178
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the face of RD. However, our results indicate that there is no significant relation between 
hope (either component) and gambling severity among relatively privileged persons. In 
sum, findings from this experiment support the notion that hope—specifically the agency 
component of hope—can act as a buffer against excessive gambling among the relatively 
deprived, a population known to participate in a range of maladaptive behaviors to cope 
with feelings of resentment stemming from RD (see Smith et al. 2012).
General Discussion
While there is evidence that some RD individuals engage in maladaptive activities (i.e., 
gambling) to temporarily alleviate negative feelings stemming from RD (Callan et  al. 
2008), not all RD individuals engage in maladaptive behaviors (Zoogah 2010). This paper 
posited that hope—a unique form of positivity that looms during negative circumstances 
to help improve the future—would predict whether individuals engage in maladaptive 
behaviors to cope with RD or not. Consistent with our predictions, in Experiment 1, we 
found an inverse correlation between agency-thinking (i.e., goal-directed energy) and risk-
taking among the relatively deprived. Employing an experimental design, Experiment 2 
demonstrated that feelings of relative deprivation cause greater risk-taking among low 
agency-thinking individuals, providing further confirmation that hope—specifically the 
agency component of hope—can buffer against excessive risk-taking among the relatively 
deprived. Building on the first two experiments, results from Experiment 3 showed that 
hope and RD have the predicted association on real-world risk behavior (gambling behav-
ior). While Snyder et al. (1991) suggested that both components of hope are fundamental 
in goal pursuit, our results indicate that only agency-thinking impacts risk-taking. These 
findings are consistent with Snyder’s (1994, 2002) view that agency-thinking is especially 
vital when encountering difficulties. Taking our findings into account, we encourage future 
research to examine whether factors that enrich agency-thinking are particularly useful in 
protecting at-risk individuals from participating in illicit behaviors.
Although this paper’s primary focus was to explore the impact of relative deprivation on 
risk behavior, our findings that relatively affluent individuals take greater risks when high 
Fig. 6  The effect of agency-thinking and RD (in Interaction) on PGSI  in Experiment 3. Note. Points are 
plotted at ±1 SD of the mean
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in hope (as found in Experiments 1 and 2) requires further interpretation. It is the case that 
affluent individuals also engage in illicit behaviors (e.g., Racz et al. 2011), but we specu-
late that unlike their relatively deprived counterparts, their desire to engage in maladaptive 
behaviors does not root from their need to allay negative feelings. Instead, the relatively 
affluent engage in illicit behaviors for recreational purposes (see Sterk-Elifson 1996; see 
also Blaszczynski and Nower 2002 for discussion of multiple pathways to problem gam-
bling). Thus, characteristics of hope, such as the enhanced ability to cope with negative 
events, may cause the relatively affluent to appraise risks more positively (i.e., not ruminate 
on potential adverse consequences), in turn encouraging these individuals to take greater 
risks. However, as the relatively affluent participate in maladaptive behaviors for recrea-
tional purposes, they are likely to stop when the fun stops, which would suggest that hope 
would not influence their real-world risk behavior (as found in Experiment 3). Although 
findings across this paper are supportive of our interpretation, further research is required 
to confirm these claims.
This paper has some limitations. It is important to recognise that the majority of par-
ticipants in the first two experiments were female psychology undergraduates, thus it is 
unclear whether (or not) the findings from these experiments can be generalised to the gen-
eral population. Similarly, the use of snowball sampling in Experiment 3 meant that we 
were unable to recruit a similar number of female and male gamblers, thus our findings 
should be interpreted with some caution. Finally, due to budgetary/financial constraints, 
not all participants in Experiments 1 and 2 received money for points gained during the 
risk game, though empirical evidence indicates that such a payment structure does not 
impact behavior (see Charness et al. 2016).
Despite these limitations, our findings across all three experiments indicate that hope 
can protect the relatively deprived from engaging in risky behaviors. More specifically, our 
findings that agency-thinking reduces risk-taking and gambling severity among a relatively 
deprived population (as demonstrated across three experiments) can have real-world impli-
cations and thus merits further discussion, especially as our results suggest that hope may 
make for positive interventions in cases of problem gambling. To conclude, we believe that 
our findings should encourage scholars to conduct intervention-based studies to examine 
whether hope can be used as an intervention in cases of problem gambling and similar 
maladaptive behaviors.
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